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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSE CRUZ-MEZA, : Case No. 20011017-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State argues that Appellant Jose Cruz-Meza's out-of-court statement that he 
killed Angie Zabriskie should be admitted into evidence without its accompanying 
explanation. Appellee's Br. 10-11. The State's argument is unconvincing. 
The State first asserts that the common law rule of completeness does not require 
admission of the entire conversation because the rule was abrogated by the rules of 
evidence. Appellee's Br. 14-15. This is incorrect. No rule of evidence or interpretive case 
has ever purported to replace, modify, or abrogate the common law rule of completeness. 
Indeed, the drafters of the rules of evidence have specifically stated that many evidentiary 
matters are not covered by the rules and that, where no rule applies, the common law 
continues to govern. Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 13 (1996). 
There is no reason to presume that this does not hold true for the rule of completeness. 
The State also says that the rule was not incorporated into Rule of Evidence 611, 
which emphasizes the trial court's power to effectively guide proceedings towards the 
ascertainment of truth. Appellee's Br. 15-21. To begin with, the rule of completeness 
stands on its own as common law,1 and so it is not critical to identify a rule of evidence 
that incorporates it. However, Rule 611 is a natural conduit for the application of the rule 
of completeness. Professor Edward Kimball and Magistrate Ronald Boyce, who helped 
draft the rules of evidence, specifically identified Rule 611 as allowing for the completion 
of verbal evidence. Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law at 1-32 & 1-
33 (1996). Also, Rule 61 lfs purpose is to require the trial court to guide proceedings 
toward the ascertainment of the truth. Utah R.Evid. 611(a) (2002). This echos the purpose 
of the common law rule of completeness, and provides further reason to require complete 
introduction of evidence. 
The State further argues that some rules of evidence such as Rule 804(b)(3), which 
allows evidence of statements-against-interest, requires the exclusion of that portion of 
Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation in which he explains the killing. Appellee's Br. 22-27. In 
1
 State v. Dunkley. 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah 1935); State v. Romero. 128 P. 530, 536 
(Utah 1912). These cases were overruled on other grounds by State v. Crank. In Crank, the Utah 
Supreme Court examined the issue of whether the jury or trial court should decide the 
voluntariness of a criminal confession. State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 184-85 (Utah 1943). The 
Court held that this is a matter for the trial judge to consider, and that it should be considered in 
light of all of the evidence on the circumstances and the defendant's competency. Id. at 185-88. 
Then, if the court is satisfied, the confession may be introduced to the jury. Id. at 188. In 
considering these voluntary statements, the jury, of course, may then accept or reject them as 
truthful. Id. 
Some earlier cases, such as Dunkley and Romero dealt with the issue of voluntariness in 
a slightly different way, and to that extent these cases were overruled. Id. However, this does not 
affect the rule of completeness holdings in Dunkley and Romero. 
2 
support of this argument, the State cites two federal cases interpreting the federal 
statement-against-interest rule. Appellee's Br. 23-24. However, the factual circumstances 
of those case are very different from the circumstances here. In the federal cases, 
coconspirators made statements implicating the defendants.2 But here, Mr. Cruz-Meza 
made an out-of-court confession. R. 432 [78-91]. Different evidentiary rules apply to 
these two circumstances. And, in any event, the federal statement-against-interest rule is 
very different the Utah rule.3 And so, the federal cases are not persuasive. 
The State makes a few other arguments, including an argument that all facts and 
inferences should be viewed in its favor and that Mr. Cruz-Meza should have marshaled 
the evidence to show the challenged evidentiary ruling was wrong. Appellee's Br. 24-26. 
However, the State confuses the standard of review applicable in this case with the 
standard of review applicable in sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases and other cases where 
factual findings are challenged. In such cases, this Court often views the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State. State v. Widdison. 2001 UT 60, f 74, 28 P.3d 1278. 
Also, a clearly erroneous standard often applies. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 
n.l 1 (Utah 1993). However, this case involves no such issues. The issues here involve the 
application of evidentiary rules and due process, not sufficiency of the evidence or facts. 
It is well-settled that, when "no finding of fact is challenged, the issue is one of law." 
2
 Williamson v. United States. 512 U.S. 594, 596-97 (1994); Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 
116,121-22(1990). 
3
 Compare Utah R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (2002); Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (1994). 
3 
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). And so, the 
State's arguments are without merit. 
In sum, the State has offered no substantial justification for introducing that part of 
an out-of-court conversation which is most favorable to it, while excluding those portions 
helpful to the defendant. In light of the common law rule of completeness, as well as 
fairness and due process, this approach should be rejected and the entire conversation 
should be allowed into evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIM, THE COMPLETENESS RULE 
REQUIRES THE ADMISSION OF MR. CRUZ-MEZA'S ENTIRE 
STATEMENT, NOT JUST THE PARTS FAVORABLE TO THE STATE 
The State argues that only selected portions of Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation with 
Ms. Santa-Cruz should be admitted into evidence because: 1) the common law rule of 
completeness was abrogated by the adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Appellee's 
Br. 14-15; 2) the common law rule of completeness is not incorporated into Rule of 
Evidence 611, which emphasizes the trial court's power to effectively guide proceedings 
towards the ascertainment of truth, IdL at 15-21; and 3) the portions of Mr. Cruz-Meza's 
confession which support his defense of extreme emotional distress are specifically 
excluded under Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which allows evidence of statements against 
interest. Id at 22-27. None of the State's arguments are convincing. 
4 
A. The Common Law Rule of Completeness was not Abrogated in Utah 
The State's first argument, which is that the common law rule of completeness was 
abrogated by the adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence, is particularly weak. In fact, 
there is no support for it. None of the rules of evidence purport to abrogate the common 
law rule of completeness. And, no court case has ever held that the rule was modified or 
abandoned by the rules of evidence. What is more, the common law rule of completeness 
cannot be considered abrogated without language to this effect either in the rules of 
evidence or statutory law.4 Indeed, as Utah evidence experts Edward Kimball and Ronald 
Boyce,5 explicitly observed, "[a] number of evidence matters are simply not covered by 
the 1983 rules and to that extent common law continues to govern."6 
4
 See Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 1-2 through 1-6 (1996) 
(concluding that there are two sources of evidentiary law, the rules of evidence as promulgated 
by a committee acting under direction of the judiciary, and the legislature). 
5
 Professor Kimball and Magistrate Boyce are experts by virtue of their legal credentials 
and the fact that they were members of the original rules of evidence advisory committee in 
1977. Utah R.Evid. Prelim. Note. 
6
 Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 13 (1996). Professor Kimball 
and Magistrate Boyce fully explain the relationship between the rules and common law as 
follows: 
While our effort [in writing Utah Evidence Law] has been to include all cases 
decided since adoption of the 1983 Utah Rules of Evidence, we also give 
substantial attention to many Utah evidence cases decided under common law and 
under the 1971 Utah evidence rules. 
One could take the position that the whole world of evidence law was made new 
by the adoption of a whole new evidence code, but that would be unrealistic. 
There are many differences between the 1971 and 1983 sets of rules, yet there are 
also many similarities. While it is possible for the same words to have different 
meanings under the two codes, since they stand in distinctive contexts and with 
different legislative histories, yet it would be disingenuous to assert that the older 
5 
This is true in practice as well as in theory. The case law shows that, where the 
rules of evidence are silent, the common law rules continue to govern. One example of 
this is the area of common law evidentiary privileges. Privileges include the freedom 
from inquiry into religious belief,7 political vote,8 or state secret.9 And, evidence of the 
waiver of the constitutional right against self-incrimination continues to be governed by 
common law.10 Further, the admissibility of scientific evidence is governed by common 
law because the rules of evidence are not directly on point.11 
cases do not or should not have any influence. To the extent that they reflect the 
interpretation of a specific form of words they are less important than when they 
address matters of policy. Policy questions, too, call for different answers as 
circumstances change, but they ought not be divorced from prior experience. 
For this reason, allusion is often made to cases that were applying pre-1983 law, 
but the reader is reminded to use them with caution. They are a legitimate source 
of insight, but to the extent they deal with subjects covered by the current rules 
they are not precedent in the sense of stare decisis; they are only influential in the 
same way that dicta and decisions of other jurisdictions are influential, that is 
simply by the persuasiveness of their advocacy. 
A number of evidence matters are simply not covered by the 1983 rules and to 
that extent common law continues to govern. There are other things that are 
arguably intended to be governed by the new rules but not clearly so. 
IdL at 13-14. 
7
 Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 5-24 (1996). 
8
 Utah Const, art. IV, § 8; Ritchie v. Richards, 47 P. 670, 680 (1896). 
9
 United States v. Reynolds. 345 U.S. 1,6-11 (1953). 
10
 Rogers v. United States. 340 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1951); State v. Younglove. 409 P.2d 
125, 126 (Utah 1965). 
11
 Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 7-9 through 7-10 (1996). 
6 
Another area where the common law is highly influential is in the area of 
relevancy. Although Rules 401 and 402 of the Rules of Evidence define relevancy and 
provide for the admissibility of relevant evidence, Utah Evid.R. 401 & 402 (2002), these 
rules provide no guidance for the treatment of things such as "similar fact evidence." And 
so, we turn to the common law.12 Common law also fills in the gaps in areas such as 
spousal confidentiality13 and clergy confidentiality.14 Most significantly, many hearsay 
exceptions such as admissions are interpreted in harmony with the body of common law 
that is their genesis.15 
All in all, there is no support for the State's position that common law rules such 
as the rule of completeness were abrogated merely by the establishment of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. On the contrary, expert commentary emphasizes that the common law 
continues to govern whenever there is no rule of evidence directly on point. Edward 
12
 In the case of "similar fact evidence" the common law dictates that, if there is a 
"substantial similarity" between a separate incident and the one at issue, evidence of the separate 
incident may be admitted. Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-8 (1996) 
(citing Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Jones. 694 P.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Utah 1984); Redevelopment 
Agency v. Mitsui Investment. Inc.. 522 P.2d 1370, 1371 (Utah 1974)). 
13
 State v. Brown. 383 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah 1963) (error for prosecutor to comment on 
failure of defendant's wife to testify in support of defendant's alibi); State v. Brown. 395 P.2d 
727, 728-29 (Utah 1964) (no error to comment on wife's claim of privilege in earlier trial to 
impeach her when she chose to testify in the retrial); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 785-87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to comment on defendant's invocation of privilege 
[then available by statute] that defendant had married prospective witness to prevent her from 
testifying). 
14
 Scott v. Hammock. 870 P.2d 947, 955-56 (Utah 1994). 
15
 First Nat'l Bank v. Osborne. 503 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1972). 
7 
Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 13 (1996). And, in the area of verbal 
completeness, no rule of evidence is on point. Nor has completeness been abrogated or 
even impliedly abrogated. So, it continues to apply to require the admission of a complete 
piece of evidence. 
B. Because the Rule of Completeness is Embodied in the Common Law, it is 
Immaterial Whether it is Facilitated by the Rules of Evidence 
The State's second argument addresses Mr. Cruz-Meza's assertion that the 
common law rule of completeness, while embodied in the common law, is also authorized 
by Rule of Evidence 611, which requires the trial court to promote fairness at trial. Aplt. 
Br. 23-26. Appellee's Br. 15-21. The State disagrees this assertion. Appellee's Br. 15-21. 
However, the State does not support its position, but merely summarizes the authority in 
Mr. Cruz-Meza's favor and then says that it doesn't apply. Id at 15-18. Notably, the State 
does not indicate why it doesn't apply. Id. And so, the State's claim is weak. 
What is more, the common law rule of completeness stands firmly as a common 
law rule whether or not it is embodied in any rule of evidence. As shown above, many 
evidentiary common law rules as such as the waiver of the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination,16 the admissibility of scientific evidence,17 and the admissibility of 
16
 Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373-75; Younglove, 409 P.2d at 126; State v. Bvington, 200 P.2d 
723,724-26(1948). 
17
 Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 7-9 through 7-10 (1996). 
8 
"similar fact evidence"18 stand solid by virtue of the common law, not by the rules of 
evidence. The common law rule of completeness does not need to be embodied in the 
rules of evidence to apply. 
Nonetheless, Rule 611 of the rules of evidence does incorporate the rule of 
completeness. Rule 611 was specifically recommended as a method of completing 
evidence by two drafters of the rules of evidence. Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah 
Evidence Law, 1-32 & 1-33 (1996). And, the language of Rule 611, which says that the 
court should "make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of 
the truth," Utah R.Evid. 611(a) (2002), echos the principal of fundamental fairness that is 
at the heart of the common law rule of completeness. Because of this, Rule 611 is an 
excellent conduit for applying the rule of completeness in the event some justification in 
the rules of evidence is desired. 
But the State argues that there must still be some trustworthiness attached to the 
evidence. Appellee's Br. at 18-20. This point is worth examination. 
Trustworthiness is always an important issue. It is the jury's focus during 
deliberation, and it is the court's focus when determining whether to submit particular 
evidence to the jury. On the one hand, the jury weighs evidence subjectively, according to 
experience and opinion, and determines the truthfulness of it. But for the judge, evidence 
takes on a sufficient level of trustworthiness once it falls into an accepted category of 
18
 Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-8 (1996) (citing Jones. 694 
P.2d at 1036-37; Mitsui Investment. Inc.. 522 P.2d at 1371). 
9 
admissible evidence. The rule of completeness defines one such category. 
Under the rule of completeness, once a portion of a writing, statement, or 
conversation is admitted into evidence, the whole thing must be admitted. Carver v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 694, 696-97 (1897). This is because if part of a writing, 
statement, or conversation is deemed admissible, it is nonsensical to deem another part 
inadmissible. IdL In other words, if part is considered trustworthy enough to submit to the 
jury for their subjective consideration, then the other part should be admitted. There is no 
reasonable basis for applying different tests of trustworthiness to different parts of the 
same document or statement or conversation. Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and 
Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53-54 
(1996). And so, under the common law rule of completeness, the trustworthiness that the 
State seeks is assumed for a whole writing, statement, or conversation once part of it is 
admitted. 
C. Mr. Cruz-Meza's Confession Cannot be Dissected Under Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3), Which Allows Evidence of Statements Against Interest 
The State argues that some rules of evidence such as Rule 804(b)(3),which allows 
evidence of statements against interest, specifically exclude those portions of Mr. Cruz-
Meza's confession that support his defense of extreme emotional distress. Appellee's Br. 
22-27. According to the State, these portions are self-serving and self-serving statements 
are automatically excluded even when they are part of a confession. Id In support, the 
10 
State cites Williamson v. United States and Lilly v. Virginia. Id. at 23-24. 
But Williamson and Lilly did not deal with a defendant's confession and 
accompanying explanation, as is the case here. Instead, Williamson and Lilly dealt with 
accomplices who had accused the defendants of the greater share of culpability for 
crimes.19 This is a special category of evidence, and in Utah it is dealt with under 
suitably-tailored evidentiary rules. Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(2) & 806 (2002). These suitably-
tailored rules, as well as relevant common law, require independent support for a 
coconspirator's testimony against a defendant.20 They also provide that, if the 
coconspirator's statement is admitted, the defendant's own statements regarding his 
involvement in the conspiracy must be admitted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1143 
(Utah 1989). Further, under the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions 
the coconspirator is usually called as a witness,21 and then the defendant is entitled to 
cross-examine him. Utah R.Evid. 806 (2002). 
This special area of evidence is not interchangeable with our situation here, which 
involves a conversational confession by the defendant himself. And so, even though 
Williamson and Lilly may be persuasive in Utah insofar as they relate to the admissions 
19
 See Williamson v. United States. 512 U.S. 594, 596-97 (1994) (Harris was stopped for 
weaving on the highway, and 19 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in the trunk. Harris 
originally claimed it belonged to an unidentified Cuban, but later said he was transporting the 
cocaine to Atlanta for co-defendant Williamson); Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1990) 
(defendant in a store robbery stated that co-defendant was the one who shot the storekeeper). 
20
 State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313. 1319 (Utah 1986): State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161. 1166 
(Utah 1980). 
21
 State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 479-81 (Utah 1990). 
11 
of party-opponent rules and coconspirator confession jurisprudence, they are not relevant 
here. 
Nonetheless, the State quotes part of Williamson for the proposition that any 
exculpatory statements made by a defendant during a confession are automatically 
inadmissible. Appellee's Br. 23. The State quotes Williamson as follows: 
One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, 
especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-
inculpatory nature.. . . Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones 
which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere 
proximity to the other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the 
plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements. 
Id at 23 (quoting Williamson. 512 U.S. at 599-600). 
While intriguing, this quote is of little importance here because it was made in 
different circumstances. In those circumstances, a coconspirator made a statement to 
police and later said that the statement was false and changed his story.22 This left the 
court grappling with the admissibility of the statements. Id at 598. But in this case, it is a 
defendant's confession outside of court that is at issue. And so the factual differences 
between this case and Williamson are too different to provide for helpful analogy. 
More importantly, the legal bases of this case and Williamson differ widely. The 
22
 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 596-97, 600. The coconspirator's first story was given shortly 
after his arrest. After his arrest, which was spawned by an officer's discover of 19 kilograms of 
cocaine in his trunk, IcL at 596, the coconspirator then told an investigator over the telephone that 
he got the cocaine from a Cuban and that it belonged to the defendant, Williamson. Id. Later, 
when the investigator spoke to the coconspirator personally, he told the investigator that there 
was no Cuban, and that the cocaine was being transported for Williamson, who had fled when he 
saw the coconspirator stopped by police. Id. at 597. 
12 
issues in this case involve the common law rule of completeness and due process, Aplt. 
Br. 12-32, and Williamson focused solely on the federal statement-against-interest rule, 
which is a far cry from anything in the Utah rules. In fact, not even the Utah statement-
against-interest rule is similar.23 And so Williamson is not persuasive. 
This is particularly true considering that, common law completeness aside, the 
adoption of the statement from Williamson is inadvisable in circumstances such as those 
here. The Williamson statement has proved to be an inaccurate observation about 
statement-against-interest rules, as well as impractical and unpopular. It was decried by 
three justices in a Williamson concurring opinion.24 And, it has rarely been heeded in any 
The Utah statement-against-interest rule reads: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil 
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, 
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness 
of the statement. 
Utah R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (2002). On the other hand, the federal rule, as quoted in Williamson 
indicates that statements against interest are: 
"statements] which . . . at the time of [their] making . . . so far tended to subject 
the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statements] unless believing 
[them] to be true." 
Williamson. 512 U.S. at 599 (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3)). 
24
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed out that there is no reason to believe 
the federal statement-against-interest rule was meant to automatically exclude any collateral 
statements. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 612. Indeed, one of the soundest legal minds, Dean 
Wigmore, strongly argued in favor of admitting all portions of a confessional statement, and 
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jurisdiction beyond the federal jurisdiction. It has been overtly rejected in states such as 
Michigan, New Hampshire,25 and Virginia.26 And, most importantly, it has been rejected 
in states with statement-against-interest rules similar to Utah's.27 
The reasons for this have been well-enunciated by the Kansas courts. As the 
Kansas Supreme Court pointed out, this principle could be used to break a defendant's 
statement down into misleading and partially-informative tidbits which the State may use 
to its unfair advantage. This injustice, the Court held, cannot be tolerated: 
It is simply not permissible to admit an incriminating hearsay statement by 
the defendant while denying the admission of exculpatory portions of the 
same hearsay statement through the use of the hearsay rule. Where the State 
has introduced portions of the defendant's statement which are 
allowing the jury to assess the statement. Id Wigmore explained that the whole statement should 
be admitted because the '"circumstances fairly indicate] the declarant's sincerity and accuracy . 
. . . " Id (citation omitted). Another viewpoint, expounded by Dean McCormick, is that neutral 
collateral statements are admissible, but self-serving ones are not. Id 
But the leading opinion in Williamson focused on only one viewpoint, that of Professor 
Jefferson, who argued that neither collateral neutral nor collateral self-serving statements should 
be admissible. Id Justice Kennedy pointed out that there is nothing to show that the Jefferson 
perspective on collateral statements is better than any other. Id at 613. More importantly, the 
Advisory Committee's Note on the federal rule specifically refers to the admission of at least 
some collateral statements. Id. at 614. Also, the common law basis for the rule indicates that 
related statements are admissible along with the statement-against-interest. Id. at 615. 
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Renhquist joined this opinion. Id. at 611. 
25
 State v. Sonthikoummane. 769 A.2d 330, 320-21 (N.H. 2000). 
26
 Chandlery. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 225 (Va. 1995). 
27
 See Bernal v. People. 44 P.3d 184, 195 (Colo. 2002) ("We [have already] held in 
Newton, in contrast to the United States Supreme Court's determination regarding the federal 
version of 804(b)(3), that under Colorado's version of 804(b)(3) a trial court may admit related, 
collaterally neutral statements made by the declarant in addition to the precise statement against 
penal interest.") 
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incriminating, the defendant is allowed to introduce exculpatory portions of 
his or her statement, even though the defendant does not intend to testify 
and such evidence is barred by the hearsay rule. 
State v. Hills. 957 P.2d 496, 503-04 (Kan. 1998). 
One of the good points about this holding is that it does not require a criminal 
defendant to chose between his constitutional right not to incriminate himself and the 
unfairness that would result from the government's presentation of only the most 
damning part of his confession. Instead, it simply requires the admission of the 
defendant's entire statement once any portion of it is admitted. It is both fair and sound. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals more fully explored this principle in the case of 
State v. Brickhouse. In Brickhouse, the defendant was arrested on drug charges. State v. 
Brickhouse. 890 P.2d 353, 356 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). An acquaintance who had been 
involved in a drug deal had implicated the defendant. IdL at 357. Later, however, the 
acquaintance told police that the defendant was not involved. Id At trial, the court 
admitted the acquaintance's incriminating statements under the statement-against-interest 
rule, while excluding the exonerating ones as inadmissible hearsay. IdL at 359. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, declaring that this application of the hearsay rule 
violated due process and was fundamentally unfair: 
[H]ere, the hearsay rule was applied to deprive defendant of evidence vital 
to his theory of defense, while at the same time that rule was manipulated to 
admit into evidence a hearsay statement of the same declarant incriminating 
defendant. We suggest that such an application of the hearsay rule is unfair 
and deprived defendant of the right to present his theory of defense to the 
jury. Whatever name one may wish to use, the admission of an 
incriminating hearsay statement, coupled with the refusal to admit an 
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exculpatory hearsay statement by the same declarant, is so fundamentally 
unfair as to be an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process under the 
facts presented. 
We hold that if an incriminating hearsay statement is admitted in an effort 
to convict a defendant, an exculpatory hearsay statement by the same 
declarant which tends to exonerate that defendant or which supports the 
theory of defense may not be denied admission into evidence on the 
grounds that it is unreliable. Application of the hearsay rule in this manner 
offends our sense of justice and fair play and affects the jury process in an 
unacceptable manner. The question of whether the exculpatory statement is 
reliable is overridden by the inherent unfairness that will occur if that 
statement is excluded while a similar hearsay statement that is incriminating 
is admitted. 
Id. 
This type of injustice is precisely what the State seeks to carry out here. The State 
wishes to submit the bare evidence that Mr. Cruz-Meza told Ms. Santa-Cruz that he killed 
Ms. Zabriskie, but the State does not want the submission of the accompanying 
explanation. And, the trial court has agreed that the confession should be allowed in, but 
that the accompanying explanation is inadmissible hearsay.28 This is the same type of 
unjust evidentiaiy manipulation decried by the Kansas courts, and it is fundamentally 
unfair because the confession and explanation were part of the same conversation with 
the same person. There is no reason to exclude the only parts favorable to Mr. Cruz-Meza 
beyond just plain unfairness. And so, the trial court's conclusion should be reversed. 
28
 The State filed a "Motion (in limine) to Exclude Hearsay Statements" and argued that 
it should be allowed to present evidence that Mr. Cruz-Meza confessed to the killing, without 
any of his explanation about the circumstances. R. 112-15. The trial court accepted this 
argument, concluding that Mr. Cruz-Meza's explanation was inadmissible hearsay. R. 383-84. 
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II. THE STATE HAS NOT ALLAYED ANY OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CONCERNS STEMMING FROM THE ADMISSION OF PARTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
The State only superficially addresses the argument that introducing part of a 
defendant's statement into evidence violates the constitutional right of due process. Aplt. 
26-32. Specifically, the State does not provide in-depth argument and relevant case law. It 
simply comments that evidentiary issues are rarely "of constitutional proportion," and 
that Mr. Cruz-Meza could testify himself if he wanted the jury to hear the remainder of 
his conversation with Ms. Cruz-Meza. Appellee's Br. 33-34. But neither of these 
comments are helpful, and they do not allay the concerns of due process. 
Under due process, a criminal defendant must be provided with a meaningful 
opportunity to present the evidence in his favor. State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation with Ms. Santa-Cruz, while containing a 
confession, does include some mitigating information that is relevant to his affirmative 
defense of extreme emotional distress. Aplt Br. 28-31. This information should not be 
suppressed, particularly in view of the fact that part of the conversation has already been 
deemed admissible. R. 383-84. 
The State's failure to offer any real response to this demonstrates the soundness of 
admitting the whole conversation. The State's comment that evidentiary issues are rarely 
of constitutional proportion is misleading because many evidentiary issues are directly 
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related to constitutional rights.29 And, at any rate, the statistical frequency with which 
constitutional issues arise in general is not relevant to the fact that a constitutional issue is 
part of this case. Aplt. Br. 26-32. Further, the suggestion that Mr. Cruz-Meza can 
complete the State's partial presentation of his conversation with Ms. Santa-Cruz by 
taking the stand himself is not appropriate because it forces him to chose between 
presenting his defense and forfeiting his right to avoid testifying. Aplt. Br. 24-25. It 
would also be an inadequate way to repair the damage done by the earlier introduction of 
only part of the conversation. Aplt. Br. 25. 
The only real argument that the State makes, besides incorrectly asserting that 
facts and inferences should always be viewed in its favor,30 is that the portion of Mr. 
Many constitutional rights, such as the right to confront witnesses, State v. Hadfield, 
788 P.2d 506, 508-10 (Utah 1990), and the privilege against self-incrimination, Texas v. Cobb, 
532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001), are at the heart of evidentiary issues. 
30
 Throughout its brief, the State complains about Mr. Cruz-Meza's phrasing of the facts 
and says that all facts and inferences should be viewed in its favor. Appellee's Br. 3-6, 9, 24-26. 
The State also complains that Mr. Cruz-Meza has failed to marshal the evidence to show that the 
trial court's evidentiary decision is incorrect. Appellee's Br. 26. 
To begin with, the State is flatly wrong in its assertion that all facts and inferences should 
be viewed in its favor. The State appears to be confusing the standard of review applicable in 
this case with the standard of review applicable in sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues and 
factual-finding issues. In sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues, the reviewing court must view the 
evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Widdison, 2001 
UT 60, Tf74, 28 P.3d 1278. And, in factual-finding reviews, a reviewing court does not reverse 
unless the finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.l 1 (Utah 1993). 
However, here the issue is not about sufficiency or fact-finding. It is about the 
enunciation and application of the evidentiary rule of completeness, and constitutional due 
process. Aplt. Br. 12-32. Both of these issues involve the trial court's interpretation of the law, 
not its role as a fact-finder. Actually, this is usually the case when the admissibility of evidence 
is appealed. State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 692-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) See also State v. 
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Cruz-Meza's conversation which he seeks to admit is inadmissible under Rule of 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) (trial court's denial of defendant's motion to exclude 
evidence of a prior conviction reviewed for correctness); State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 
26, ^[18, 21 P.3d 212 ("The trial court's judgment contained no express conclusions of law with 
regard to [the defendant's] claims of error. However, the inference inherent in the judgment is 
that the trial court found no merit to [his] constitutional and jurisdictional arguments.") State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) ('The standard by which we review a trial court's 
decision to admit evidence of an eyewitness identification is essentially the same as that 
applicable to a trial court decision to admit a confession. Our task is to review the record 
evidence and determine from the totality of the circumstances whether the admission of the 
identification is consistent with the due process guarantees of article I, section 7.") And, in cases 
such as this, the case should be viewed objectively, without favor to either party, and all of the 
facts and inferences on the record should be considered, not just those favorable to the State. 
The State is also wrong in its assertion that some type of evidence marshaling is required 
in this case. Because Mr. Cruz-Meza has not challenged any of the trial court's findings of fact, 
only its application of the evidentiary law and a constitutional issue, a marshaling of the facts is 
pointless. What this case requires is research and analysis of the relevant case law, history, 
principal, and policy, not evidence marshaling. 
The State cites State v. Widdison in support of its argument that marshaling is required. 
This case holds that, when a defendant challenges a factual finding, all of the evidence in favor 
of the finding must be marshaled and then the defendant must show that it is insufficient to 
support the finding. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f60. Mr. Cruz-Meza does not dispute this. However, 
this principal is irrelevant here because he has not challenged any factual findings. When "no 
finding of fact is challenged, the issue is one of law." Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 
928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). 
The issues in this case are issues of law. This is established by a short review of the 
differences between issues of fact as issues of law. This Court enunciated those differences in 
Lysenko v. Sawaya: 
Question of fact "are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, 
events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the 
subjective, such as state of mind." Legal questions, in contrast, "are defined as 
those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances." 
Lysenko v. Swaya. 2000 UT 58, |17, 7 P.3d 783 (citations omitted). Here, no events, actions, or 
happenings, or the existence of any such things are challenged. What is challenged is the trial 
court's interpretation of the evidentiary law and due process. Therefore, the evidence marshaling 
requirement is inapplicable. 
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Evidence 803(3), which provides for the admission of then-existing mental, emotional, or 
physical conditions. Appellee's Br. 29-32. However, Rule 803(3) is irrelevant here. The 
State confuses Rule 803(3) with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress 
contained in the murder statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (Supp. 2002), and it is this 
defense that concerns us here. 
Extreme emotional distress is a condition that, if asserted, may be affirmed or 
negated by the fact-finder. It may be proved by any relevant evidence that is properly 
admitted. It does not depend solely upon then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition evidence, or any other particular type of evidence. It may be proved by any 
evidence admissible under any evidentiary rules.31 
And so, the question of whether evidence of Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation with 
Ms. Santa-Cruz is admissible under Rule 803(3) is not determinative. In fact, it is 
irrelevant. Mr. Cruz-Meza does not even argue that Rule 803(3) applies; he argues that 
the common law rule of completeness, Rule 611, and due process applies. 
31
 See McCormick on Evidence 462-63 (5th ed. 1999) ('The term affirmative defense is 
traditionally used to describe the allocation of a burden, either of production or of persuasion, or 
both, to the defendant in a criminal case. The burden is fixed by statute or case law at the 
beginning of the case and does not depend upon the introduction of any evidence by the 
prosecution. For example, a crime may be statutorily defined as consisting of elements A and B. 
However, the accused may be exonerated or the offense reduced in degree upon proof of C. C is 
an affirmative defense. In some instances, the defendant may simply have the burden of 
production of evidence with regard to C; in the event that [the] burden is satisfied, the 
prosecution will then have the burden of persuading the jury of elements A, B, C beyond a 
reasonable doubt, In other instances, the defendant will have both the burden of production and 
the burden of persuasion. Thus the prosecution will have no burden with regard to C; the 
defendant must both introduce proof of C and persuade the jury of its existence. Usually, the 
measure of persuasion imposed on the defendant with regard to an affirmative defense is a 
preponderance of the evidence.") (italics deleted). 
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In short, the State has failed to give any substantial reason why due process does 
not compel the admission of that portion of Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation which is 
helpful to him. It also fails to show why dissecting the conversation and thereby removing 
context and clarity is fair or legally sound. Accordingly, this Court should rule that, if part 
of Mr. Cruz-Meza's conversation with Ms. Santa-Cruz comes in, the remainder should 
come in. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cruz-Meza's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for a fair trial that includes evidence of Ms. Santa-Cruz's entire conversation with Mr. 
Cruz-Meza about the killing. 
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